Abstract-In this paper, we introduce a new vulnerability of cyber-physical systems to malicious attack. It arises when the physical plant, that is modeled as a continuous-time LTI system, is controlled by a digital controller. In the sampled-data framework, most anomaly detectors monitor the plant's output only at discrete time instants, and thus, nothing abnormal can be detected as long as the sampled output behaves normal. This implies that if an actuator attack drives the plant's state to pass through the kernel of the output matrix at each sensing time, then the attack compromises the system while remaining stealthy. We show that this type of attack always exists when the sampleddata system has an input redundancy, i.e., the number of inputs being larger than that of the outputs or the sampling rate of the actuators being higher than that of the sensors. Simulation results for the X-38 vehicle and for the other numerical examples illustrate this new attack strategy possibly brings disastrous consequences.
I. INTRODUCTION
R ECENT development of communication capabilities and computational resources has led to the integration of cyber-technologies and physical processes, which improves efficiency and flexibility of the system. These Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) include not only simple or small devices, but also a variety of critical infrastructures that are closely related to public health and numerous financial costs. Examples include nuclear facilities, power grid (smart grid), supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system, and networked transportation. For this reason, the security problem of CPS has received a lot of attention in recent years.
In particular, cyber-attacks on CPS may bring disastrous consequences, and their impacts are well illustrated by subsequent incidents, such as the Stuxnet attack on Iran's nuclear plant [1] , massive power blackouts in South America [2] , Maroochy water breach in Australia [3] , and cyber-attack on the Ukrainian power grid [4] . These instances highlight the need for measuring the vulnerabilities of CPS against malicious attacks and unexpected errors. There have been several researches that examine the vulnerabilities of CPS from
The material in this paper was partially presented at the 55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), December 12-14, 2016 , Las Vegas, NV, USA [12] . the control-theoretic point of view. For instance, the weakness of electric power grids, possibly caused by false data injection attacks, was studied in [5] . An undetectable sensor attack to the unstable system was presented in [6] . More recently, the authors of [7] explored the question which resources should be utilized for the attack design, also focusing on various attack scenarios including denial of service (DoS) attack [8] , replay attack [9] , zero-dynamics attack [10] , local zero-dynamics attack, and bias injection attack.
It is worth mentioning that most of the researches on security problems of CPS have been studied either in continuoustime or in discrete-time domain. From a practical standpoint, however, usual cyber-physical systems are composed of continuous-time physical plants and discrete-time digital controllers. It means that, for thorough understanding of cybersecurity, interaction between the continuous-time and discretetime components should come into the picture. In this regard, we are concerned with the security problem for sampleddata control system that consists of a multi-input multi-output (MIMO) continuous-time plant, samplers, and zero-order hold (ZOH) devices. Specifically, we allow that the sampling rate of the actuators be different from that of the sensors. These multi-rate sampling schemes have been widely studied in the literature for specific purposes. For example, a faster actuation than sensing has been adopted to improve control performance such as inter-sample behavior, disturbance rejection, and so on [13] - [17] . On the other hand, faster sensing has advantages on state feedback control design, acceleration control, and security problem [18] - [20] .
In this paper, we show that the sampled-data systems are possibly vulnerable to a malicious adversary who utilizes an input redundancy of the systems. This redundancy becomes available to the attacker when (a) the sampling rate of the actuator is faster than that of the sensor, or (b) the number of inputs is larger than that of the outputs. Using the input redundancy, we present a new type of stealthy attack in the sampled-data framework. The underlying idea for the attack design is to express the sampled-data system as an extended lifted system with a stacked state variable, and to enforce the state to remain a (nontrivial) kernel of its output matrix (at sampling times). In doing so, the attack cannot be detected by any (discrete-time) anomaly detector that is built upon the sampled measurements of the output; at the same time, the inter-sample behavior of the physical plant is compromised. We will show that all of these can be done with the input redundancy. It should be pointed out that, unlike the wellknown zero-dynamics attack [7] , [10] , [11] , the proposed attack policy is applicable even when there is no unstable Fig. 1 : Sampled-data system connected through network zero (either for continuous-time model or for its sampled-data counterpart).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the problem formulation. Section III provides an attack design and studies when and how the adversary successfully spoils the sampled-data control systems. A few numerical examples and case studies can be found in Section IV. Concluding remarks and further discussions are given in Section V.
Notation: For two vectors a and b, col(a, b) stands for
The sets of natural, rational, and real numbers are denoted by N, Q, and R, respectively. The notation x denotes the Euclidean norm for vector x. For a real number r ∈ R, r denotes the largest integer which is smaller than or equal to r. For a matrix A, ker A implies the null space of A and im A is the range space of A.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a compromised continuous-time physical system modeled asẋ (t) = Ax(t) + B(u(t) + a(t)),
where x ∈ R n is the system state, u, a ∈ R p , and y ∈ R q are the input, a malicious attack, and the output of the system, respectively, and A ∈ R n×n , B ∈ R n×p , and C ∈ R q×n . Throughout the paper we suppose that the plant (1) is connected with a discrete-time controller through a communication network as seen in Fig. 1 . Specifically, it is assumed that the discrete-time control is performed with the "sampler" for the output y(t) with the sampling period T s , and the "zeroorder holder (ZOH)" for both the input u(t) and the attack signal a(t) with the sampling period T a . Hence, u(t) and a(t) are piecewise constant functions such that u(t) = u(iT a ) and a(t) = a(iT a ) for iT a ≤ t < (i + 1)T a . It is supposed that u(iT a ) =ū In this paper, we are interested in general multi-rate sampled-data systems where T s and T a are not necessarily the same. In particular, the ratio between T s and T a is assumed to satisfy
In what follows, we often use the coprime fraction R = β/α with α, β ∈ N (rather than (2)). It should be noticed that, while the actuation times are t = iT a with i = 0, 1, · · · , there is no reason that the sensing time (when the output y(t) is sampled) is synchronized with the actuation time in practice. 1 So, let us suppose that the sensing times are t = jT s + ∆ with j = 0, 1, · · · , where 0 ≤ ∆ < T s is called an offset in this paper. Note that, while actuation times and sensing times are asynchronous, distribution of their times exhibits a pattern that repeats in every αT s = βT a seconds (see Fig. 2 ) since R = T s /T a = β/α. For convenience, we define a normalized offset δ := ∆/T s (so that 0 ≤ δ < 1), and a new index (which is a real number) as
Then j δ = (j − 1) + δ if δ > 0 and j δ = j if δ = 0. Using the index j δ , the sampled-data system in terms of the sensing times can be written in the discrete-time domain as
. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that t = 0 be the time when the attack is initiated. Now, for comparison, let x o be the solution of (3) without any attack (i.e., a(t) ≡ 0) and let y o = Cx o . It is noted that x o (0) = x(0) since the attack starts at t = 0. Then, with the error variables
we have the error dynamics (obtained from (3)) as
The problem to be studied is to generate an attack signalā [i] having the following two important features simultaneously.
This property directly implies that y(j δ T s ) ≡ y o (j δ T s ) for all j ≥ 1, and thus, the plant (3) under the attack seemingly operates normally as if it is attack-free. Thus, no anomaly detector that usesū[i] andȳ[j] can detect the attack.
Definition 2: For a given sequence of positive thresholds
The disruptive property indicates that the size of the error statex(t) becomes larger than H k at least once within the k-th time interval of the length βT a (that is, the time interval for β times of actuations, or α times of measurements). Strength of the attack can be considered as the values of the sequence
, whose selection is fully upon the adversary. A conventional solution to this problem is, as widely studied in the literature, the so-called zero-dynamics attack [10] . However, this attack is effective only when the system is of nonminimum phase, and the strength of the attack is determined solely by the plant's zero-dynamics, and so the attacker is not able to assign the speed of divergence. Moreover, it is not a completely stealthy attack in the sense that its initiation causes a transient that can be observed from the output. (Therefore, in practice, the initial condition of the zero-dynamics attacker is set to be small enough so that the transient can hide below the alarm level in the anomaly detector.) On the other hand, the proposed attack is 'zero-stealthy' implying that the attacked output is exactly the same as the normal one at every sampling times.
In this paper, we propose a zero-stealthy disruptive attack for the sampled-data system that is possibly more lethal than the conventional zero-dynamics attack. Our proposal is based on the assumption that the sampled-data system (3) has a kind of input redundancy. This is the case when the zero-order holder works faster than the sampler (that is, R is larger than 1), or the number p of the input channel is larger than that of the output channel, q. Then, as we shall see below, the adversary can generate a new type of stealthy attack that has disruptive behavior with arbitrarily large thresholds.
III. DESIGN OF ZERO-STEALTHY ATTACK WITH DISRUPTIVE PROPERTY
The first task for the attack design is to rewrite the sampleddata system (4) in the actuation time frame with T a as
where the last equality follows fromx(0) = 0, and
For progression, we need generalized notations about A d and B d , which are related to both T s and T a as follows: , respectively.
A. Clustering the Time Frame
To construct the attack sequenceā[i] efficiently, let us introduce the concept of 'cluster.' The k-th cluster is defined as the time period (k − 1)βT a < t ≤ kβT a (and sometimes we indicate the left-closed interval (k − 1)βT a ≤ t < kβT a by calling it the k-th input-cluster). It can be seen that each cluster contains exactly α sensing times and β actuation times. See Fig. 2 for the case of R = 4/7 with ∆ > 0. By exploiting these clusters, we will consider the error dynamics (4) in terms of the clusters. For this, let us define stacked attack vector in the k-th input-cluster, and the stacked states and the stacked measurements in the k-th cluster, as follows: for k = 1, 2, · · · ,
. . .
where C := I α ⊗ C (I α is the identity matrix of size α and ⊗ is the Kronecker product). It is noted that the vectorỹ k is the collection of α measurements within one cluster. Now, let us focus on the terminal state of each cluster, which is denoted byx c [k] :=x(kβT a ) ∈ R n . Then, from (5), one can derive that
Similarly, one can derive the following for x k .
Lemma 1: It follows that
. . . and the (l, m)-th block of Π ∈ R αn×βp is defined as follows:
for l = 1, · · · , α.
Proof: Consider the first cluster k = 1, in which the statẽ x(0) at the beginning of the cluster is zero andx c [0] = 0. With the property j δ R T a ≤ j δ RT a = j δ T s , one can compute the statex(j δ T s ), whose sensing time j δ T s belongs to this cluster, by the variation of constant formula as follows:
When 1 δ R = 0 (which happens if j = 1 and 1 δ T s < T a ), it should be interpreted that the summation term in the above equation is zero or null. The discussion so far verifies (7) and the matrix Π for k = 1.
For the general k-th clusters (k > 1), the derivation is the same (because the pattern for actuation and sensing times are repeated along the clusters) except that the statex c [k − 1] = x((k − 1)βT a ) need not be zero. Taking into accountx c [k − 1] as the initial condition for the corresponding cluster, one can easily verify (7) for k > 1. Once (7) is verified, (8) trivially follows. Now, let us define the disruption time
, which is the time when the disruptive property is met within the k-th cluster. The sequence
is chosen by adversary, and it is often a fixed number, for convenience, like T * k = βT a or T * k = βT a /2 for all k. For simplicity of presentation, let us normalize the disruption time as t *
Then, the error state at the disruption time t k , which we will denote asx a [k] :=x(t k ), is computed as follows.
Lemma 2: It follows that
At * k βTa and
The proof is similarly done as Lemma 1. For the first cluster (k = 1), the statex a at time t 1 is evaluated similarly as (10) 
Like in Lemma 1, if βt * 1 = 0, the summation term in the above equation becomes zero. Thus, (11) and (12) (11) is easily verified.
Note that, if all T * k are chosen as a constant for all k ≥ 1, then bothĀ * k and Φ * k are constant matrices. Now, with Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, the problem of our interest is reformulated in a cluster-wise sense; i.e., our interest becomes designing an attack sequenceā k that satisfies x a [k] ≥ H k (disruptive property), and at the same time,ỹ k ≡ 0 for each k-th cluster (zero-stealthy property) for all k ≥ 1.
B. Conditions for Attack Design
With equations (7), (8) , and (11) at hand, conditions for attack design can be established. First of all, by (8) , stealthiness of the attack is obtained if the attack sequenceā k for the k-th cluster belongs to the kernel of CΠ, and so, we require the kernel is non-trivial. Second, for the disruptive property of the statex a [k] in (11), we ask the kernel of Φ * k not to include the kernel of CΠ because, if ker Φ * k ⊃ ker CΠ, then any stealthy attack has no affect onx a [k]. Finally, as the attack is initiated, the statex(t) becomes non-zero, and therefore, even if the attackā k − 1 is designed to be stealthy from the measurement vectorỹ k − 1 for the (k − 1)-th cluster, it may become detectable through non-zerox c [k−1] =x((k−1)βT a ) in the k-th cluster. See (7) and (8) . In order to counteract it, we require the range space of CĀ α would belong to the range space of CΠ so that some component of the attack sequencē a k is designed to cancel the effect ofx c [k − 1] onỹ k . These discussions yield the following formal assumption.
Assumption 1: The following conditions hold:
A few sufficient conditions for Assumption 1 can be derived. For example, since CΠ ∈ R αq×βp so that αq < βp implies ker CΠ = {0}, the item (a) is satisfied either when the number p of inputs is large, or when the actuator works faster than the sensor (i.e., R = T s /T a = β/α is large enough). Hence, a sufficient condition for the item (a) is obviously qT a < pT s , which is simpler to check than item (a). On the other hand, it is noted that the condition (c) holds if the matrix CΠ has full row rank or if the matrix Π has full row rank. Finally, for the condition (b), we have the following. 
with which the condition (b) holds. Proof: By the condition (a), pick any non-zero z = col(z 1 , · · · , z β ) ∈ ker CΠ where z i ∈ R p . Define the index i * := min{i : z i = 0, i = 1, . . . , β}, and pick the disruption time t * k ∈ (0, 1] such that i * = βt * k . Then, it follows from (12) that Φ * k z = B d z i * = 0 since B d has full column rank. This implies that ker CΠ ⊂ ker Φ * k , i.e., the item (b). Remark 1: As a special case, let us consider the case when R is a positive integer (i.e., R = N ≥ 1 so that α = 1 and β = N ), and δ = 0. This is the case that has been studied in [12] . In this case, we have C = C,Ā α = e ATs = A 
It is clear that the above conditions hold if q < N p and if either C[A
] has full row rank. On the other hand, in [12] , the disruption time t * k is determined in the assumption as one of {1/N, 2/N, · · · , 1}. It is noted from (12) that, for each candidate of t *
To facilitate selection of t * k among the candidates, the condition of [12] reads as
When this condition holds, one can pick suitable t * k among the candidates for the condition (b) of Assumption 1. Another sufficient condition for (b) in this special case is: (b") ker C ∩ im Π = {0}. This is because (b") means that there exists a vector v such that Πv = 0 and Πv ∈ ker C. This implies that the vector v belongs to ker CΠ while it does not belong to ker Π, which guarantees (b') with t * k = 1. In Section IV-A, we demonstrate this case with N = 1.
C. Off-line Construction of Attack Signal
In this subsection, based on Assumption 1, we design an attack sequenceā[i], or equivalentlyā k , that solves the reformulated problem; i.e., to make x a [k] ≥ H k and y k ≡ 0 for k = 1, 2, · · · . In particular, we propose the sequenceā k in the following form:
where κ k is a positive constant and η k , ζ k ∈ R βp . The idea is to pick η k such that Πη k is stealthy (i.e., belongs to ker C) but disruptive (i.e., Φ * k η k = 0) while κ k decides the intensity 
The attack signal is designed sequentially, i.e., in the order ofā 1 ,ā 2 , and so on. As the first step, let ζ 1 = 0 (since there is no attack before the time t = 0), and pick η 1 ∈ ker CΠ such that Φ * 1 η 1 = 0 (whose existence is guaranteed by Assumption 1.(a) ). Then, stealthiness follows sincẽ
For the disruptive property, pick κ 1 > 0 such that
By this, a stealthy and disruptive attack signalā[0], · · · ,ā[β − 1] is obtained for the first cluster (0, βT a ]. In order to designā 2 for the second cluster, consider
Similarly as before, pick η 2 such that
and pick ζ 2 such that
Sincex
we take κ 2 such that
This ensures stealthiness and disruptive property of the attack in the second cluster (βT a , 2βT a ]. We now generalize the procedure.
Procedure of Attack Signal Generation:
Step k (k = 1, 2 . . . ): Take ζ k so that the following equation holds:
and select a positive κ k such that
With these terms, constructā k = κ k η k + ζ k and updatẽ
It is noted that the construction of attack sequence can be done off-line, or a priori before the attack begins, because the procedure does not need any realtime information. Moreover, if the normalized disruption time t * k ∈ (0, 1] is chosen as a fixed constant for all k ≥ 1, then the matrices Φ * k are the same for all k ≥ 1. Then, the vector η k can also be chosen as a constant η.
We close this section by summarizing the discussions so far. Theorem 1: Suppose that the adversary has the information of T s , T a , and ∆ as well as the system information of A, B, and C. If R = T s /T a ∈ Q and Assumption 1 holds with normalized disruption times {t *
constructed via the proposed procedure has the zerostealthy property and the disruptive property for any given
IV. EXAMPLES A. Numerical Example: R = 1 with δ = 0
In this subsection, we study a simple example in order to illuminate the attack generation procedure for the case R = 1 without offset, as discussed in Remark 1. For this, let us consider the error dynamics (4) with
With a zero-order holder and sampler whose sampling periods are T a = T s = 1 sec (and thus R = 1), its sampled-data system is given by (5) with
It is easily seen that Assumption 1 holds for the above system (see Remark 1). In particular, q < Rp so that (a) holds and the matrix CΠ = CB d has full row rank so that (c) holds. Also, the matrix B d has full column rank, and so, by (the proof of) Proposition 1, the condition (b) holds with t * k = i * /β = 1/1. Now, for given H k = k, an attack sequenceā k = κ k η k + ζ k is constructed as follows:
Step 1: Set ζ 1 = col(0, 0) and η 1 = col(−0.343, 0.939) ∈ ker CΠ such that Φ *
Step 2: Choose ζ 2 such that (16) Similarly, the remaining steps proceed with η k = η 1 . The designed attack sequence is injected into the control input at t = 0 sec. Fig. 4 shows the continuous-time statex(t) from its initial conditionx(0) = col(0, 0, 0). Note thatx(t) is the error between the attack-free state x o (t) and the state x(t) under attack. In this figure, it is observed that the error x(t) moves far from the origin while it repeatedly encounters ker C. The sampled error outputỹ(jT s ) remains zero as seen in Fig. 5) (zero-stealthy property) . On the other hand, from Fig. 6 , one can see that the disruptive property is satisfied; that is, As another example, we consider the X-38 vehicle model which is a prototype flight test vehicles for crew return vehicle [13] . In [13] , the X-38 is operated by a multi-rate digital controller whose holder operates four times faster than the sampler (i.e., R = T s /T a = 4) with T a = 0.04 sec and T s = 0.16 sec. The X-38 model has 3 inputs, 9 outputs, and 11 states (A ∈ R 11×11 , B ∈ R 11×3 , and C ∈ R 9×11 ). More detailed information on the X-38 plant is provided in [13] , [23] .
From the information of X-38 model in [13] (that is omitted in this paper), one can verify that Assumption 1 holds by the following reasons:
• Rp = 12 and q = 9, and so, the condition (a) holds (i.e., CΠ ∈ R 9×12 so that ker CΠ = {0}),
• the matrix B d has full column rank, and there exists a non-zero vector z such that CΠz = 0 where the first 3 components are a non-zero vector in R 3 . Then, by the proof of Proposition 1, i * = 1. Therefore, the condition (b) holds with t * k = i * /β = 1/4,
• the matrix CΠ has full row rank so that im CΠ = R 9 and the condition (c) holds. Now, following the proposed attack generation procedure, we construct an attack sequenceā k = κ k ζ k + η k with disruptive property H k = 0.5k. In particular, we have chosen and ζ k 's and κ k 's are selected to satisfy (19) and (20), respectively. To see the effect of the attack, the attack sequence is injected into the input channel of the plant at t = 0 sec. Fig. 7 shows the injected attack and Fig. 8 illustrates the state error x(t). In spite of the disruptive property seen in Fig. 8 , the measured output at sampling times look normal (Fig. 9.(c) ). In fact, the continuous-time output y(t) is not calm as seen in Fig. 9.(b) while the attack-free continuout-time output y o (t) is also depicted for comparison in Fig. 9.(a) . In this subsection, we show that the proposed attack is effective under Assumption 1, even if the sampling period of the sensor is shorter than that of the actuator. Let us consider the case where T a = 1 sec and T s = 0.4 sec, so that R = 0.4/1 = 2/5 = β/α (i.e., there are 5 sensings and 2 actuations for each cluster). Moreover, let us assume an offset with δ = 0.3/0.4 = 0.75 (i.e., the sensor starts 0.3 sec later than the actuator). The considered plant is described by a minimal realization of
.
From the minimal realization A ∈ R 5×5 , B ∈ R 5×3 , and C ∈ R 1×5 , one can verify Assumption 1 as follows:
• The plant has 3 inputs, 1 output, and R = 0.4. Hence, q = 1 < Rp = 1.2, and so, the condition (a) holds (i.e., CΠ ∈ R 5×6 so that ker CΠ = {0}).
• The matrix B d has full column rank, and there exists a non-zero vector z such that CΠz = 0 where the first 3 components are a non-zero vector in R 3 . Then, by the proof of Proposition 1, i * = 1. Therefore, the condition (b) holds with t * k = i * /β = 1/2.
• The matrix CΠ has full row rank so that im CΠ = R The simulation results illustrate the constructed attack signal in Fig. 10 , the behavior ofx(t) in Fig. 11 , and the output signal y(t) in Fig. 12 , respectively. It is seen that, even if the error variablex(t) and the continuous-time outputỹ(t) diverge, the output measurements (represented as red circles in Fig. 12 ) remain zero, so that both stealthiness and disruptive property are achieved.
Out of curiosity, we have simulated the case where the actual R is 0.4004 but is estimated as R = 0.4, so that the attack signal is designed based on R = 0.4. As seen in Fig. 13 , the measured output does not remain zero forever, but if the estimate is sufficiently close to the true value, it is expected that the detection of the attack is delayed until a fatal damage is incurred in the plant.
Finally, in order to detect such an attack, one may deploy a mechanism of intermittent output sampling in addition to periodic sampling. Clearly, Fig. 12 and 13 show that additional output sample will yield non-zero values that would call attention of the operator.
V. CONCLUDING REMARK AND FUTURE WORKS
It has been recently studied that the interconnection between continuous-and discrete-time components may make some CPS more vulnerable to cyber-physical attacks (for instance, the zero-dynamics attack targeting the sampling zeros [20] , [21] ). We have clarified in this paper that another type of zero-stealthy attack is also possible, if there exists enough input redundancy for the system in the multi-rate or multiinput sense. By taking a closer look at the state trajectory in both continuous-and discrete-time domains, we showed that how the additional input resources and full system knowledge enable the adversary to compromise the inter-sample behavior of the sampled-data system, while being perfectly undetected at each sampling time.
Future works include consideration of input saturation and investigation of the case when R, the ratio of T s and T a , is real number. By analyzing the proposed construction of attack signal, we expect to figure out quantitative relationship between H k and the saturation level. When the ratio between sampling period and actuation period is a real number, by approximating it as a rational number sufficiently closely, we expect to delay the detection of attack as much as we want, under strictly positive error threshold of anomaly detector.
Finally, it is also necessary to develop a method to detect the proposed attack. At this moment, we just think that intermittent random sampling of the output in addition to periodic sampling, removing unnecessary input channels, or concealing the system knowledge may be helpful.
